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ABSTRACT 
Liberal international relations theory posits that states¶ behaviour is affected both by 
domestic interests and other states with which they are linked in significant patterns of 
interdependence. :HH[DPLQHWKHUHOHYDQFHRIWKLVSURSRVLWLRQWRVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXULQ
the most powerful institution in the furthest reaching example of regional integration 
LQWKHZRUOGWRGD\VWDWHV¶voting behaviour in the Council of the European Union. 
Compared to previous research, we examine more detailed evidence on the substance 
of the political debates that preceded Council votes. WHILQGWKDWPHPEHUVWDWHV¶
disagreement with both discretionary and non-discretionary decision outcomes affects 
the likelihood that they dissent at the voting stage. Moreover, in line with our theory, 
WKHEHKDYLRXURIVWDWHV¶VLJQLILFDQWWUDGLQJSDUWQHUVKDVDSDUWLFXODUO\PDUNHGHIIHFWon 
the likelihood that they will dissent.  
 
 
Key words: Council of the European Union, voting behaviour, legislative decision-
making, discretion, domestic interests, interdependence. 
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$IWHUWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V(8PHPEHUVWDWHVnegotiate on legislative proposals, 
they have the opportunity to vote in the Council of the EU. 6WDWHV¶EHKDYLRXUDWWKH
voting stage provides an excellent research opportunity to refine and test two central 
propositions of liberal international relations theory (Moravcsik 1997). The first is 
WKDWVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXULVWRDODUJHH[WHQWGHWHUPLQHGE\their preferences. The second 
is that their behaviour is also affected by significant patterns of interdependence. 
Developing and testing these propositions in the context of voting in the Council 
requires a more detailed analysis of the contents of legislative proposals than offered 
in most existing studies RIVWDWHV¶YRWLQJEHKDYLRXU in the Council (Mattila 2004; 
2008; 2009; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006; Hagemann 2008; Hosli et al. 2011; 
Plechanovová 2011). The important research that has been published in this journal 
and elsewhere typically examines large numbers of votes, usually several hundreds or 
even thousandsDQGH[SORUHVJHQHUDOSDWWHUQVLQPHPEHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXUIRU
instance by identifying which states generally vote in similar ways. Our study 
complements this existing research by developing theoretical propositions that include 
VWDWHV¶ policy positions on the proposals on which they vote and testing these 
propositions with more detailed information than has previously been available.  
 Existing research indicates that dissent is a rare event. In one of the most 
recent studies, Hosli et al. (2011) examined 1,358 acts that were voted on in the 
period from May 2004 to December 2006 when the EU consisted of 25 member states 
(Hosli et al. 2011). This gives a massive 33,950 observations in which a member state 
could have dissented. The researchers identified dissent in the form of voting against, 
abstaining or entering statements in the Council minutes in only 432 of these cases, 
which amounts to only 1.3 per cent of the observations. This finding fits well with 
depictions of the Council as a place where actors adhere to the norm of consensus 
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(Heisenberg 2005; Lewis 2008). However, it sits uncomfortably with research that 
reveals the presence of considerable disagreement among member states on legislative 
proposals (Arregui 2008; Thomson 2011: Chapter 3). A trivial explanation of the 
different findings may be that these studies focus on different sets of cases, but we 
show that this is not the reason.  
 The following section sets out our conception of dissent at the voting stage and 
our proposed explanation of this phenomenon. Our explanation is relevant to 
proposals that raise at least some controversy. We then describe our research design, 
which includes the most detailed dataset currently available on specific controversies 
raised by legislative proposals: the DEUII dataset (Thomson et al. 2006; 2012). The 
research design section also describes how we operationalise the key independent and 
dependent variables in our study. The final sections present the analyses and 
conclusions. 
 
DISSENT AT THE VOTING STAGE: CONCEPTUALISATION AND 
EXPLANATION 
 
Dissent is a clear display of disagreement by a member state with the contents of a 
proposal at the voting stage. Dissent in this context is public behaviour, not 
clandestine opposition. It consists of voting against, abstaining, or placing a statement 
that conveys disagreement with at least one aspect of the proposal without necessarily 
voting against or abstaining. Hagemann (2008) was to our knowledge the first 
researcher to investigate statements by member states in Council minutes in addition 
to abstaining or voting. Placing statements is an important behaviour to include when 
studying how often and why dissent occurs, since this behaviour serves the same 
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function as voting against or abstaining. Moreover, member states insert statements 
that register their disagreement without formally voting against or abstaining. Not all 
VWDWHPHQWVFOHDUO\VLJQDOPHPEHUVWDWHV¶GLVDJUHHPent with the contents of proposals, 
EXWLQVWHDGFODULI\DVWDWH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSURSRVDOLQTXHVWLRQ6XFKFODULI\LQJ
statements do not fall under our definition of dissent. 
 Hosli et al. (2011) suggest that entering statements, abstaining and voting 
against form an ordered scale of increasing levels of opposition to a proposal. We 
disagree that there is a clear ascending order in the level of opposition, and instead 
treat these behaviours as equivalent. A strongly worded statement may serve as a 
stronger signal of opposition than a vote against or abstention. Furthermore, when the 
qualified majority voting rule applies in the Council, voting against and abstaining are 
equivalent in that the proposal needs to receive the support of member states that 
together meet the threshold. By contrast, when the unanimity rule applies, only voting 
against can block the passage of a proposal, since abstentions do not count as no 
votes. Our main theoretical interest lies in explaining dissent, not the particular form it 
takes. A secondary consideration is that given the rarity of dissent, there are too few 
observations with which to identify the causes of each of the three forms of dissent 
with a sufficient degree of confidence.  
When explaining the occurrence of dissent at the voting stage, our point of 
departure is that the policy positions expressed by member states in the preceding 
negotiations reflect their underlying policy preferences, and that the differences 
between these preferences and the outcomes of the negotiations affect whether they 
GLVVHQW6WDWHV¶SROLF\SUHIHUHQFHVDUHGHILQHGWRDODUJHH[WHQWE\WKHLUQDWLRQDO
economic and political attributes. This is one of the core propositions of liberal 
international relations theory: in particular the proposition WKDWµ>V@WDWHV«UHSUHVHQW
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some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define 
VWDWHSUHIHUHQFHVDQGDFWSXUSRVHIXOO\LQZRUOGSROLWLFV¶DQGWKDWµZKDWVWDWHVZDQWLV
WKHSULPDU\GHWHUPLQDQWRIZKDWWKH\GR¶(Moravcsik 1997: 518, 521). Similarly, 
$FKHQVXJJHVWVWKDWVWDWHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDUHUHDGLO\REVHUYDEOHLQWKHLUSROLF\
SRVLWLRQVµ$QDFWRU¶V³PRVWSUHIHUUHGSRLQW´LVDFOHDULGHDDQGUHODWLYHO\HDV\WR
PHDVXUH¶ 
Governments generally prefer to avoid the adjustment costs involved in 
changing existing policies. These adjustment costs include investments in new 
policies and procedures to bring about policy change, as well as the effects of political 
opposition to change. Groups with entrenched interests in existing policies often voice 
opposition to change, and governments generally find it far more difficult to enact 
policy changes than to accept the policies inherited from previous governments (Rose 
and Davies 1994). Consequently, when staking out policy positions in EU 
negotiations, state officials often advocate the uploading of their national 
arrangements to the European level (Börzel 2002). An official from a permanent 
representation of a member state in Brussels described the way in which states 
typically IRUPXODWHWKHLUSRVLWLRQVGXULQJQHJRWLDWLRQVµPHPEHUVWDWHVRIWHQWU\WR
JLYHWKHLUQDWLRQDOODZVDVD³JLIW´WRWKHUHVWRI(XURSHE\DUJXLQJWKDWHYHU\RQH
VKRXOGGRLWWKHLUZD\¶1 Similarly, a case study of thH(8¶VDLUSROOXWLRQUHJLPH
illustrates how Germany and the UK attempted to fashion EU regulations in line with 
their existing national arrangements (Héritier 1995: 278-9).  
 Our overarching expectation is that member states are more likely to dissent 
from a proposal, the more they disagree with the outcomes contained in it. The 
mechanism behind this effect is that governments seek to avoid negative effects on 
their domestic levels of support from political opposition by groups with entrenched 
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interests in the status quo. By dissenting at the voting stage, governments signal to 
these groups that they are not the ones responsible for the policy changes being 
introduced. According to this mechanism, dissent at the voting stage is not an attempt 
to avoid the material costs involved in implementing policy change, such as setting up 
new national agencies to implement an initiative or restructuring bureaucracies. By 
the time a proposal is at the stage of being formally adopted in the Council, either by 
a formal vote or simply by being agreed, it is invariably clear that the proposal has 
sufficient support to pass. Therefore, dissenting behaviour cannot be an attempt to 
avoid such material costs. Because decision-making in the Council is far from 
transparent, such publicly registered verifications of dissent are relevant to 
governments that wish to make domestic groups aware of their opposition to the 
proposals. 
 We expect the effect of disagreement to be weaker, although still present, 
when the outcomes with which states disagree give them discretion. Laws often 
contain discretionary provisions ((SVWHLQDQG2¶+DOORUDQFranchino 2007; 
Thomson and Torenvlied 2011). We conceive of discretionary provisions broadly, as 
outcomes that grant discretionary power to member states during the implementation 
stage or that exclude contentious provisions altogether. Discretionary outcomes allow 
states to keep their existing arrangements to at least some extent. Such flexibility 
allows member states to avoid or reduce domestic adjustment costs. In this way, 
discretion weakens the impact of member VWDWHV¶GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKGHFLVLRQ
outcomes on their propensity to dissent. The effect of disagreement is unlikely to be 
eliminated entirely, because discretionary outcomes often specify some limits or 
conditions to which member states must adhere within a range of policy options. 
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 2XUH[SHFWDWLRQWKDWVWDWHV¶GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKRXWFRPHVLQFUHDVHVWKH
OLNHOLKRRGWKH\ZLOOGLVVHQWFRQWUDVWVZLWK1RYDN¶VYLHZRQµVLOHQFHDVD
PHDQVRIDYRLGLQJEODPH¶$FFRUGLQJWR1RYDN¶VUHVHDUFKZKLFKLVEDVHG on 
interviews with practitioners, member states remain silent at the voting stage, even 
ZKHQGHFLVLRQRXWFRPHVGHYLDWHIURPWKHLUSUHIHUHQFHVVRWKDWGRPHVWLFLQWHUHVWV¶
attention is not drawn to the fact that their national governments lost. We 
acknowledge that many practitioners hold this view, but do not find it plausible that 
domestic interests are oblivious to legislative proposals that affect their interests even 
moderately. Domestic interests are aware of the fact that Brussels is an increasingly 
important source of regulation, and they monitor EU developments closely. The 
DQDO\VHVSUHVHQWHGKHUHDOORZRXUDUJXPHQWWKDWµYRLFHLVDPHDQVRIDYRLGLQJEODPH¶
to be tested against the alternative DUJXPHQWWKDWµVLOHQFHLVDPHDQVRIDYRLGLQJ
EODPH¶ 
 Our expectation on the effect of disagreement on dissent is similar to that of 
Høyland and Wøien Hansen (2014) in their recent study of Council voting, which 
H[DPLQHVVRPHRIWKHVDPHOHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOVDQGGDWDRQVWDWHV¶SROLF\
preferences that we use. Høyland and Wøien Hansen¶VVRSKLVWLFDWHGVWXG\FRQILUPV
WKDWWKHSRVVLEOHOLQNDJHEHWZHHQVWDWHV¶SROLcy preferences and voting behaviour is 
relevant to the field. However, our studies differ in numerous ways. Most importantly, 
our theoretical concern is with the effects of domestic adjustment costs, discretion 
and, as detailed below, interdependence, while Høyland and Wøien Hansen do not 
consider these factors. Moreover, their study focuses on 46 of the 118 legislative 
proposals included in our analysis.
2
 
 Another core assumption of liberal international relations theory leads us to 
expect that a member stDWH¶VGHFLVLRQRQZKHWKHUWRGLVVHQWLVDIIHFWHGE\RWKHU
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PHPEHUVWDWHVµ>7@KHH[SHFWHGEHKDYLRURIDQ\VLQJOHVWDWH«UHIOHFW>V@QRWVLPSO\LWV
own preferences, but the configuration of preferences of all states linked by patterns 
of significant policy inWHUGHSHQGHQFH¶0RUDYFVLN:KLOHDOO(8PHPEHU
VWDWHVDUHOLQNHGWRHDFKRWKHULQµSDWWHUQVRIVLJQLILFDQWSROLF\LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH¶
some are more strongly linked than others. Interdependence theorists often refer to 
trade relations (Keohane and Nye 2011). We also use trade between member states as 
a measure of interdependence, and this measure differs markedly between different 
SDLUVRUµG\DGV¶RI(8VWDWHV6LPLODUO\1DXULQDQG/LQGDKO¶VUHVHDUFKRQ
cooperation relations among member staWHV¶SHUPDQHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVLQWKH&RXQFLO
finds different levels of cooperation among member states. Not only do neighbouring 
states tend to trade more, they also tend to cooperate more in forming common 
positions. For instance the Nordic states tend to cooperate more with one another than 
with other states, as do the Visegrad states and to some extent the Southern states. For 
RXUDQDO\VLVWKHWUDGHPHDVXUHLVSUHIHUDEOHWR1DXULQDQG/LQGKDO¶VPHDVXUHVLQFH
WKHODWWHULVEDVHGRQNH\LQIRUPDQWV¶MXGJHPHQWVDQGPD\QRWEHH[RJHQRXVWRVWDWHV¶
voting behaviour. 
We expect any given state to be influenced by the behaviour of other states, 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHZLWKZKLFKLWKDVVWURQJLQWHUGHSHQGHQFLHV$OWKRXJKVWDWHV¶YRWLQJ
behaviour occurs simultaneously at the voting stage, member states that object so 
strongly to a proposal that they intend to dissent in some way at the voting stage 
usually make that clear earlier in the negotiations. This means that their behaviour, or 
at least intended behaviour, has WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDIIHFWLQJRWKHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXU 
7KHUHDUHVHYHUDOUHDVRQVZK\VWDWHV¶SURSHQVLW\WRGLVVHQWFRXOGEHDIIHFWHG
by the dissenting behaviour of other states, particularly those with which they have 
strong interdependencies. Interdependence theorists highlight the importance of the 
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multiple channels of contact between governmental and non-governmental actors in 
interdependent states (Keohane and Nye 2011: 21). These multiple contacts, which 
are pervasive in the Council of the EU, mean that state representatives are influenced 
not only by their own domestic interests, but also by representatives of other states. 
,VVXHOLQNDJHVZKHUHE\VWDWHVFRQQHFWWKHLUEHKDYLRXURQRQHLVVXHWRRWKHUVWDWHV¶
behaviour on other issues, are another salient consequence of interdependence (ibid. 
25-,VVXHOLQNDJHVPD\DOVRFDXVHVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXUDWWKHYRWLQJVWDJHWREH
DIIHFWHGE\RWKHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXU$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVPHFKDQLVPZKHQVWDWHVGLVVHQW
DVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIDQRWKHUVWDWH¶VGLVVHQWWKH\are signalling that they are reliable 
partners. This requires a degree of reciprocity, whereby states dissent in support of 
other states in anticipation of support from those other states in the future. A distinct, 
though not contradictory mechanism refers to the social costs of dissent. Novak 
(2013: 1102) refers to the social pressure of groupthink in perpetuating silence in the 
Council at the voting stage. When cohesive group behaviour breaks down, even with 
just one state breaking the code of silence, the social costs of norm violation fall, 
which makes other states more likely to dissent.   
We summarise our theoretical expectations in the following two hypotheses: 
H1: A member state is more likely to signal dissent from a proposal, the more it 
disagrees with outcomes in the proposal, particularly with outcomes that give it little 
discretion during the implementation stage. 
H2: A member state is more likely to signal dissent from a proposal, the more other 
member states signal dissent from the proposal, particularly other states with which it 
is linked in strong patterns of interdependence. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
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The analyses are performed using the DEUII dataset (Thomson et al. 2006; 2012). We 
use 118 legislative proposals from this dataset on which we have gathered data on 
PHPEHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXUDWWKHYRWLQJVWDJH9RWLQJGDWDDUHRQO\DYDLODEOHIRU
proposals that were adopted. So our study is limited in the same way as previous 
studies in this respect. These legislative proposals were selected for raising at least a 
minimum level of controversy. Unlike previous studies of voting in the Council, we 
do not attemSWWRVWXG\PHPEHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLour in the population of votes (Mattila 
2004; 2008; 2009; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006; Hagemann 2008; Hosli et al. 2011; 
3OHFKDQRYRYi,QVWHDGRXUPDLQLQWHUHVWOLHVLQVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXULQUHODWLRQWR
proposals that are at least somewhat controversial, and in testing our theoretical 
expectations.  
Nonetheless, our theoretical propositions and empirical analyses are relevant 
WRVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXURQOHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOVWKDWZRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHG
controversial enough for inclusion in the DEU dataset. Validity tests of key 
LQIRUPDQWV¶UHSRUWVRQLVVXHVLQWKLVGDWDVHWUHYHDOHGWKDWLQIRUPDQWVJHQHUDOO\GRQRW
report issues that are of relevance to only one or two member states (Thomson et al. 
2006: 330-41). This means that states may disagree with outcomes in EU laws that 
were not controversial enough to include in our selection. In addition, our study 
contains the full possible range of variation on the explanatory variables referring to 
HDFKPHPEHUVWDWH¶VGLVDJUHHPHQW with outcomes, since we have many observations 
in which member states agreed entirely with the contents of the proposals that were 
adopted. This broadens the relevance of our study to legislative proposals that are 
uncontroversial.  
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Legislative proposals were selected according to three criteria: the time period, 
the type of legislative procedure, and the level of political importance. Regarding the 
WLPHSHULRGOHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOVZHUHLQFOXGHGLIWKH\ZHUHRQWKH&RXQFLO¶VDJHQGD
in the years 1999 and/or 2000, or were discussed for the first time in the Council after 
the 2004 enlargement. Legislative proposals introduced up to June 2008 were 
included in the post-2004 study. Concerning the decision-making procedure, the 
selected legislative proposals were subject to either the consultation or the codecision 
(now the ordinary) legislative procedures, the two most commonly used procedures. 
There is also variation in the Council voting rule, qualified majority voting (QMV) or 
unanimity, for which we control in the following analyses. Regarding political 
importance, the selection was restricted to proposals on which there was an indication 
of at least some political importance and controversy evident in media reports and 
interviews with key informants. The policy areas represented most prominently in the 
selection are agriculture, internal market, Justice and Home Affairs and fisheries, but 
many other policy areas are present too.  
 Information on coQWURYHUVLDOLVVXHVDQGDFWRUV¶LQLWLDOSRVLWLRQVRQWKHVHLVVXHV
was collected in 349 semi-structured interviews with key informants. These 
interviews typically lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The key informants were 
selected for their knowledge of the detail of the dossiers under investigation. 
Individuals with different institutional affiliations were interviewed. The 47 
Commission officials interviewed were responsible for drafting the proposals and/or 
monitoring the subsequent discussions. The 236 officials from the permanent 
representations were the responsible desk officers. The 45 individuals from the EP 
were either MEPs or their assistants. A further nine interviewees worked in the 
Council secretariat and twelve in interest groups. During the course of these semi-
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structured interviews, key informants were asked to describe the controversial issues 
to the interviewers and these controversies were reconstructed as policy scales 
ranging from 0 to 100. For each controversial issue, key informants were asked to 
µindicate the policy alternative initially favoured by each stakeholder after the 
introduction of the proposal and before the Council IRUPXODWHGLWVFRPPRQSRVLWLRQ¶. 
They were also asked to estimate the level of salience each actor attached to each 
controversial issue. Again, salience was estimated on a scale from 0 to 100. These 
salience estimates were divided by 100 in the analyses below. More details of the 
selection criteria, data collection procedures, and reliability tests are contained in the 
relevant publications of the DEU project (Thomson et al. 2006; 2012). 
 Table 1 gives an example of one of the legislative proposals included in the 
present study. The table refers to two of the controversial issues raised by the 
legislative proposal on emission allowances in the aviation sector. The Commission 
introduced this proposal in December 2006. Despite extensive consultations prior to 
the introduction of the proposal, it raised considerable controversy among the member 
states. This legislative proposal sought to address climate change by including the 
DYLDWLRQVHFWRULQWKH(8¶VHPLVVLRQVWUDGLQJVFKHPH7KHILUVWFRQWURYHUVLDOLVVXH
concerned the calculation of the quantity of pollution allowances that should be given 
to the airline industry. On one side of this debate were the actors that favoured a 
relatively low quantity of allowances, which would drive up the cost of polluting; 
these actors consisted of the Commission, EP and old EU-15 member states, although 
there were some differences within this latter group. These actors are placed at or 
close to position 100 of the policy scale representing this issue. On the other side of 
the debate were the twelve new member states; these actors promoted a relatively 
high quantity of allowances, which would permit the aviation industry to pollute more 
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(position 0)7KHRXWFRPHZDVLQOLQHZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQLWLDOOHJLVODWLYH
proposal in this respect (position 90). The second controversy concerned the 
auctioning of carbon credits; the issue was about what proportion of these credits 
should the aviation industry be allowed to auction. Again, the new member states took 
the same position, which was that there should be no auctioning. They argued that this 
would impose unacceptable costs on the aviation industry. The other actors favoured 
auctioning, but to different degrees. The Commission and most old member states 
took the position that a small proportion of the credits should be auctioned. The EP 
together with Ireland and Sweden took the most radical position, arguing that the 
LQGXVWU\VKRXOGEHDOORZHGWRDXFWLRQDIDUODUJHUDPRXQWRIFUHGLWV7KH(3¶VILUVW
opinion stated that 25 per cent of credits should be auctioned in 2011 and that this 
percentage should be increased to the level in other sectors in subsequent years. The 
outcome on this second issue involved a revision of the initial legislative proposal to 
EULQJLWVRPHZKDWFORVHUWRWKH(3¶VSURSRVHGDPHQGPHQW7KHRXWFRPHEURXJKWWKH 
percentage of credits to be auctioned up to 10 per cent by 2012 and 15 per cent by 
2013 with the possibility of revision. Key informants placed this outcome at position 
30 on the policy scale.  
Since this proposal was subject to the codecision procedure, it is unsurprising 
that the outcomes bear the mark of the EP. Given that the EP has more power under 
the codecision procedure than under the consultation procedure, states with positions 
closer to the EP generally agree more with decision outcomes and therefore have less 
policy-based incentives to dissent when codecision applies. We do not, however, 
include the legislative procedure as a control variable, since in this analysis we are 
LQWHUHVWHGLQWKHHIIHFWRIVWDWHV¶GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKRXWFRPHVRQGLVVHQW, rather than 
H[SODLQLQJYDULDWLRQLQVWDWHV¶GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKRXWFRPHV 
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<Table 1> 
 
 The outcomes contained in the emissions case do not give any discretion to 
member states with respect to the controversies identified in Table 1. The outcome on 
each of the specific controversies included in the dataset was examined to determine 
whether it gave discretion to member states during the implementation stage either by 
specifying a range of policy alternatives from which a state could choose and still 
comply with the law, or by limiting the scope of the proposal to exclude the 
contentious item from the proposed law at least in part. Although the emissions case 
does not contain discretionary outcomes, these were fairly common occurrences: a 
total of 73 out of 317 issues coded in the entire dataset (23 percent) had decision 
outcomes that were discretionary.
3
  
Since the outcomes in the emissions case were non-discretionary, we would 
expect member states that disagreed with these outcomes to signal their dissent at the 
voting stage. To some extent, the evidence supports this proposition. Malta and 
Cyprus, both of which were quite far from the decision outcome on the first main 
controversy, entered statements into the Council minutes when a vote was taken on 
October 24, 2008. The statement by Cyprus includes the following text: µ&\SUXV
would like to place on record its serious concerns regarding the adverse effects 
expected to be caused by the implementation of the proposed Directive on including 
aviation activities in WKH(76ZLWKLQWKH(8¶DQGZHQWRQWRGHWDLOWKHVHFRQFHUQV
Malta voiced similar concerns in its statement. A few other statements were also 
entered into the minutes that also indicate dissent from the contents of the proposal.
4
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 Testing our theoretical SURSRVLWLRQVUHTXLUHVDPHDVXUHRIPHPEHUVWDWHV¶
disagreement with non-discretionary and discretionary outcomes. In the following 
DQDO\VHVZHPHDVXUHDVWDWH¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKQRQ-discretionary outcomes as the 
sum of the salience weighted absolute distaQFHVEHWZHHQWKDWVWDWH¶VSROLF\SRVLWLRQV
and the non-discretionary outcomes contained in a proposal. For ease of interpretation 
in the analyses, this number is divided by 100. As a formula: 
disagreementi =  
salienceia positionia -outcomea
a=1
n
å
100
 
Where: 
disagreementi is the level of actor i¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHQRQ-discretionary 
outcomes in a proposal. 
a is the first issue in a set of n issues in a proposal that have non-discretionary 
outcomes. 
salienceia is the level of salience actor i attaches to issue a. 
positionia is the policy position of actor i on issue a. 
outcomea is the (non-discretionary) decision outcome on issue a. 
 We apply the same formula to the discretionary outcomes in a proposal to 
REWDLQDPHDVXUHRIPHPEHUVWDWHV¶GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKGLVFUHWLRQDU\ outcomes. The 
only difference is that we add the weighted distances over the issues with 
discretionary outcomes. Note that these policy distances are weighted by salience, 
which we transform to range from 0 to 1. Salience-weighted distances have been used 
LQSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVDVPHDVXUHVRIDFWRUV¶XWLOLW\ORVVHVHJBueno de Mesquita 1994: 
79-82). Member states that are indifferent (i.e. do not have a policy position on a 
controversial issue) have a salience value of zero, and therefore a value of zero on this 
disagreement measure.  
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These measures of disagreement involve comparisons of distances across 
different policy scales that refer to substantively different topics. These distances are 
comparable in the sense that the endpoints of each policy scale map out the range of 
policy alternatives considered by the actors. Although we consider such comparisons 
appropriate, we run a robustness test with dichotomous measures of these distance 
variables, which simply measure whether or not member states agreed with all of the 
non-discretionary and discretionary outcomes in a proposal, and obtain essentially the 
same results. Using dichotomous measures of disagreement means that we do not 
FRPSDUHWKHGLVWDQFHVDFURVVLVVXHVRULQFOXGHVWDWHV¶VDOLHQFHVFRUHVEXWRQO\
LQFOXGHLQIRUPDWLRQRQZKHWKHURUQRWWKHVWDWH¶Vpolicy positions deviated from at 
least one of the discretionary or non-discretionary outcomes in the proposal. 
 Our second hypothesis requires that we measure the levels of interdependence 
between each pair of member states. We follow previous research on interdependence 
and construct a measure based on trade flows between each pair of member states. We 
take the value of imports and exports between member states i and j as a percentage of 
member state i¶V*'3DVRXUPHDVXUHRIi¶VGHSHQGHQFHRQj. We take the average of 
this measure over the years 2000-05 and 2006-10, using Eurostat data, and link these 
measures to votes taken in each period. The average trade between each ordered dyad 
RIVWDWHVDVDSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHILUVWVWDWHLQWKHG\DG¶V*'3ZDVSHUFHQWLQWKH
years 2000-5 and 2.31 percent in the years 2006-10. In the first period 110 of the 210 
ordered dyads of the 15 member states had above average trade. In the second period 
185 of the 702 ordered dyads of the then 27 member states had above average trade. 
The strongest trading dyad in the second period consisted of the Czech Republic and 
*HUPDQ\ZKHUHE\WUDGHDPRXQWHGWRSHUFHQWRIWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLF¶V*'3$V
DSHUFHQWDJHRI*HUPDQ\¶V*'3WKLVWUDGHDPRXQWHGWRRQO\SHUFHQW2XU
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measure therefore reflects the fact that dependence is asymmetric. In this case, Czech 
representatives are more influenced by the behaviour of German representatives than 
vice versa. By comparison, trade between the Netherlands and Belgium amounts to 
KLJKSHUFHQWDJHVRIERWKFRXQWULHV¶*'3VDnd 25.05 per cent respectively. 
Consequently, for these interdependent states we expect both Dutch and Belgian 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶EHKDYLRXUWRLQIOXHQFHHDFKRWKHU)RUHDFKPHPEHUVWDWHLQUHODWLRQ
to each legislative proposal, we identify the number of other states with which it had 
above average trade and that dissented at the voting stage. We also identify the 
number of other states with which it had an average or less than average trade and that 
dissented. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Figures 1 and 2 give the frequencies of different types of dissent by each member 
state. Figure 1 refers to the 65 selected legislative proposals from before the 2004 
enlargement, while Figure 2 refers to the 53 selected proposals from after 2004. The 
main descriptive finding is that dissent at the voting stage is a rare event, even in this 
sample of relatively controversial legislative proposals. The height of each bar 
represents the number of cases in which the member state in question voted against, 
abstained or entered a statement in the minutes reflecting its dissent from the outcome 
without either voting against or abstaining. These are small frequencies compared to 
the numbers of proposals in our sample. The highest number of dissents was found for 
Ireland in the post-2004 period (Figure 2); Ireland signalled its disagreement at the 
voting stage on five of the fifty-three proposals in this period, which is still only 9.4 
per cent. By contrast, Ireland and two other member states (Finland and Italy) 
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dissented from none of the proposals voted on prior to the 2004 enlargement (Figure 
1). If we consider each of the 118 legislative proposals in relation to each of the 15, 
25 or 27 states that were EU members at the time each proposal was subject to a vote 
in the Council, there are 2,384 observations. In only 85 of these 2,384 observations 
did we find dissent of any kind, which amounts to only 3.6 per cent. The small 
percentage of observations with positive values of dissent means that rare-events 
logistic regression is an appropriate technique for analysing these data, since standard 
logistic regression could yield biased estimates of the effects (King and Zeng, 2001).
5
   
 
<Figure 1> 
<Figure 2> 
 
 Table 2 includes descriptive information on the independent variables included 
in the analyses. The independent variables are not highly correlated. The two 
YDULDEOHVUHIHUULQJWRRWKHUPHPEHUVWDWHV¶GLVVHQWLQJEHKDYLRXUIRUDERYHDQGEHORZ
average trading partners, are not highly correlated (r=.33). We therefore include all 
relevant variables in the same model. 
 
<Table 2> 
 
 Model 1 in Table 3 gives the results of our main model. The exponents of the 
coefficients are shown, which are interpreted as effects on odds ratios. This means 
that values above one indicate that the relevant explanatory variable has a positive 
effect on the odds that member states dissent, while values less than one indicate a 
QHJDWLYHHIIHFW,QOLQHZLWKWKHILUVWK\SRWKHVLVPHPEHUVWDWHV¶GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK
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non-discretionary decision outcomes increases the odds they will dissent at the voting 
stage. The exponentiated coefficient of 2.69 means that as our measure of 
disagreement with non-discretionary outcomes increases by one unit, the odds of 
dissent more than double. While this is a substantively important effect, given the 
rarity of dissent, this translates into probabilities of dissent that are still small in 
absolute terms. Holding other continuous variables at their means and the 
dichotomous variables at their modes, if a state agrees entirely with the non-
discretionary outcomes in a proposal, it has a predicted probability of dissenting of 
only .02 (95 per cent confidence interval (95% CI): .01; .03). This increases 
substantially in relative terms, but only marginally in absolute terms, to .04 (95% CI: 
.02; .06) if a state disagrees with non-discretionary outcomes with a value of .74, 
which is one standard deviation above the average level of disagreement. 
 The evidence supports the first part of our first hypothesis in that member 
states are more likely to dissent from a proposal, the more they disagree with the 
outcomes in it. However, the evidence does not support the second part of our 
hypothesis, in which we expected this effect to be stronger for non-discretionary 
outcomes. 7KHFRHIILFLHQWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHYDULDEOHµGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK
GLVFUHWLRQDU\RXWFRPHV¶Ls of a similar size and significance to the first variable, 
which refers to non-discretionary outcomes. The difference between the two 
coefficients is not significant. So the evidence only partially supports our first 
hypothesis. 
 The results of Model 1 in Table 3 support the second hypothesis, which posits 
that member states are influenced by the behaviour of other member states, 
particularly other states with which a state has close ties. For each additional strong 
trading partner of state i that dissents, the odds that state i dissents increases by 68 per 
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cent. As above, changes in this variable translate into large relative increases in 
predicted probabilities of dissent, but the absolute levels are still low. Again, holding 
other variables at their means or modes, on a proposal on which no other states 
dissent, any given state has a predicted probability of only .02 (95% CI: .01; .04) of 
dissenting. This increases to .04 (95% CI .02; .05) when one other strong trading 
partner dissents, and to .06 (95% CI: .04; .09) when two others dissent. 
 In line with the second hypothesis, the effect of dissenting behaviour by other 
states is weaker when those other states are not strong trading partners. The effect of 
WKRVHRWKHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXULVVWLOOSRVLWLYH and significant, but is significantly 
weaker WKDQWKDWRIVWURQJWUDGLQJSDUWQHUV¶EHKDYLRXU7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH
two coefficients is statistically significant (p<.01). 
 The magnitude of the effects revealed by these analyses must be considered in 
the context of the fact that dissent is a rare event that occurs in only 3.6 per cent of all 
observations. Taken together, the effects we have identified can amount to substantial 
variation around this low level. For cases in which a member state agrees with all of 
the outcomes, both non-discretionary and discretionary, and in which no other 
member states display dissent, the predicted probability that the member state in 
question will dissent is close to zero: .01 (95% CI: .01; .02). As above, this assumes 
the other continuous variables are set at their means and dichotomous variables at 
their modes. This probability increases to .14 (95% CI: .10; .19) for cases in which a 
member state disagrees above average with both the discretionary and non-
discretionary outcomes (one standard deviation above the average of each variable) 
and in which two strong trading partners and two weak trading partners dissent. 
 
<Table 3> 
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 These significant effects are also found in the robustness test presented in 
Model 2 in Table 3, in which the first two of our independent variables are 
dichotomised. Dichotomising the disagreement variables responds to the concern that 
it may be problematic to compare the distances and salience scores across different 
issues in different proposals. In addition, the disagreement variables are skewed, with 
the average values being close to zero (Table 2). Using dichotomous 
operationalisations ensures that results are not driven by outliers. The robustness test 
in Model 2 gives the same findings. Notably, if a member state disagrees with non-
discretionary outcomes in a proposal, the odds that it dissents are almost two times 
greater than if it agrees with those non-discretionary outcomes. Disagreement with 
discretionary outcomes has a somewhat weaker effect, although this effect is still 
significant. The other variables have the same effects as in Model 1. 
 The models also contain control variables that are to some extent relevant to 
explaining member states¶ dissent. We find no significant differences before and after 
enlargement or between old and new member states. As would be expected, dissent is 
significantly more likely when the QMV rule applies, mainly because proposals can 
still be passed with a few no votes or abstentions. Richer member states are somewhat 
more likely to dissent. Although such country characteristics have featured 
prominently in previous analyses of voting behaviour, we find the theoretical 
rationale for including them weaker than the variables identified in our explanation. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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We examined the occurrence of dissent at the voting stage in the Council of the EU 
by quantifying the proportion of cases in which member states voted against, 
abstained, or entered dissenting statements in the Council minutes without formally 
voting against or abstaining. Our WKHRU\ZKLFKHPSKDVLVHVPHPEHUVWDWHV¶
disagreement with the contents of legislative proposals, led us to focus on a set of 
proposals that raised at least some controversy after they were introduced. The main 
descriptive finding is that dissent at the voting stage is a rare event, even in relation to 
these controversial proposals. Of the 2,384 observations in our analysis, we found 
evidence of dissent in only 85 cases, which is just 3.6 per cent. This is not much 
higher than the figures reported in RWKHUVWXGLHVRIPHPEHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXUDWWKH
voting stage (Mattila 2004; 2008; 2009; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006; Hagemann 2008; 
Hosli et al. 2011; Plechanovová 2011). This is remarkable since these other studies 
focused on much larger samples of votes that included many proposals that were less 
contentious than the ones we consider.  
 We formulated and tested an explanation of dissent that was informed by 
liberal international relations theory. When member states dissent, they are attempting 
to minimise the political costs associated with domestic adjustment costs. By 
signalling their dissent from domestically unpopular EU laws, national governments 
can credibly claim they were not responsible for the policy changes brought by these 
laws. One of our main findings is that dissent is affected by the extent to which 
member states disagree with the decision outcomes on which they are voting. 
Although this inference is a simple one, it is far from DWUXLVPEHFDXVHVWDWHV¶
strategic considerations, including the preferences of other powerful states, may blur 
the linkage between their policy positions and behaviour.  
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WHILQGµYRLFHDVDPHDQVRIDYRLGLQJEODPH¶PRUHFRPSHOOLQJWKDQµVLOHQFH
as a PHDQVRIDYRLGLQJEODPH¶FI1RYDN, at least when explaining variation in 
dissent. Nonetheless, the overall picture is one of lack of dissent, and in this respect it 
could be that silence is also used to avoid blame. Future research could examine the 
conditions under which silence or voice is used to avoid blame. Our explanation 
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHSUHVHQFHRIDFWLYHGRPHVWLFLQWHUHVWVFRPELQHGZLWKVWDWHV¶
disagreement triggers dissent, and this mechanism could be further elaborated and 
tested in a future study. 
We had expected to find a stronger effect of disagreement with non-
discretionary outcomes than with discretionary outcomes, but the evidence did not 
support our expectation. Discretion has been the focus of much previous research (e.g. 
Epstein DQG2¶+DOORUDQ)UDQFKLQR7KRPVRQDQG7RUHQYOLHG. 
Among the many functions that can be served by discretion, it may increase the 
quality of public policies by empowering implementation agents that have high levels 
of policy expertise. It might also be a politically expedient way of resolving 
controversy, and this appears to be happening more frequently in the enlarged EU 
(Thomson 2011: 272). The absence of a clear effect of discretion in our study may be 
due to the fact that it is usually limited by controls on implementers, for instance in 
the form of rules and conditions that must be met. These controls might mean that 
domestic adjustment costs are expected even when decision outcomes give some 
discretion to member states. 
 Another part of our explanation posited that the likelihood of dissent by a state 
is affected by the behaviour of other states, particularly those with which it has strong 
ties. This corresponds to one of the main propositions of liberal international relations 
theory, namely WKDWVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXULVDIIHFWHGE\WKHSUHIHUHQFHVDQGEHKDYLRXURI
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other states with which they are linked in significant patterns of interdependence 
(Moravcsik 1997: 523)2XUHYLGHQFHVKRZVWKDWDVWDWH¶VGHFLVLRQRQZKHWKHURUQRW
to dissent is, over and above its own policy preferences, affected by the behaviour of 
other states, particularly by those other states with which it has above average levels 
of trade. This finding has two related implications. The first is that the strength of ties 
among member states varies and that these ties have behavioural effects. Previous 
research provided evidence of cross-cutting cleavages in the Council, whereby states 
that take similar positions on one legislative proposal often take different positions on 
other proposals (e.g. Heyes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 250). While our finding on 
the importance of strong ties among states is not inconsistent with the presence of 
cross-cutting cleavages, it does account for some of the structure we observe among 
the mesh of issue-specific alignments of member states. The second implication is 
that the norm of consensus in the Council is subject to the same mechanisms of 
violation as other norms. When people see others, particularly their friends, violating 
a norm, they are more likely to violate the norm themselves. Part of the norm of 
consensus in the EU is that member states refrain from dissenting explicitly at the 
voting stage, even when some of their policy demands have not been met (Heisenberg 
2005; Lewis 2008; Novak 2013: 1102). +RZHYHUZKHQDVWDWH¶VFORVHVWSDUWQHUV
violate this norm, it is more likely to violate the norm itself. 
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NOTES
                                                          
1
 Interview, Brussels, July 2006. 
2
 Høyland and Wøien Hansen (2014) include the 46 proposals from the DEU dataset 
that were on the agenda in the years 1999-2000 (the EU-15 period), and on which 
member states voted immediately prior to adoption, thereby excluding cases in which 
the Council voted on a common position, which was subsequently approved by the 
EP without amendment before becoming law. We include all 118 legislative 
proposals from the DEU dataset from before and after the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements on which Council voting data are available. As well as the different case 
selection and theoretical propositions, there are numerous other differences between 
our analyses including: the operationalization of the disagreement variable; the way 
indifferent actors are handled; the treatment of statements in the Council minutes, and 
the statistical model used. 
3
 Two researchers independently coded each of the 317 issues to identify whether the 
decision outcome on each issue gave discretion to member states using the definition 
given in the text. Their independent coding agreed on 295 of the issues. In a 
consensus meeting they reached agreement how to classify the remaining 22 issues. 
4
 Not all statements made by member states were instances of dissent. Several were 
clarifications of states¶SRVLWLRQs without clear indications of disagreement with the 
outcomes. Some statements were even signals of support for the laws. The dataset 
contains 142 statements of which 39 were coded as signals of dissent. Of these 39, 19 
were not coupled with dissent in the form of abstaining or voting against, and 
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therefore included in our analysis (Table 2). Two researchers independently coded the 
142 statements to identify whether they signalled dissent from the laws adopted. Their 
independent coding agreed on 130 of these 142 cases, and in a consensus meeting 
they agreed on how to classify the remaining 12 statements. 
5
 Rare-events logistic regression adjusts the standard errors to account for the skewed 
distribution, while the coefficients are the same as in normal logistic regression.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. The two main controversies raised by the proposed directive on emission 
allowances in the aviation sector 
Issue 1: On what basis should the quantity of emission allowances be determined? 
 
Position 0: Based on emissions in a 
recent year, close to start date of 
regulation (least environmental position) 
CZ, LV, PL (80), BU, EE, HU, LT, MT, 
RO, SI, SK (70), CY (60) 
70: 95% of 2005-07 annual average 
emissions 
DE (50) 
90: Annual average of 2004-06 emissions 
(Outcome) 
SE (80), COM, FR, NL, UK (70), BE, 
DK, IE, IT, LU, PT (60), AT, FI, EL (50) 
Position 100: 1990 as reference year 
(most environmental position) 
EP (80) 
 
Issue 2: What proportion of carbon credits should be auctioned? 
 
Position 0: None PL (100), CZ, HU (40), LV, LT (30), BU, 
CY, EE, RO (20), MT, SI, SK (10) 
20: 3% ES (100), DE (90), COM, FI, FR (75), IT 
(40), EL (30), AT, LU, PT (20) 
30: 10% by 2012 and 15% by 2013 with 
revision possibility (Outcome) 
NL (75), BE (40) 
50: 50% UK (50) 
70: More than 50% DK (50) 
Position 100: Maximum possible EP (90), SE (70), IE (50) 
Note: Salience scores for preceding actors in parentheses. Proposal COD/2006/304. AT: 
Austria; BE: Belgium; BU: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: 
Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: 
Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: 
Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; 
UK: United Kingdom; COM: Commission; EP: European Parliament.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 freq. mean s.d. min max 
Dependent variable      
Signal of dissent 85 .036  0 1 
   Of which voting against 35 .015  0 1 
                abstaining 31 .013  0 1 
                entering a statement without 
abstaining or voting against 
19 .008  0 1 
      
Explanatory variables       
06¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKQRQ-discretionary 
outcomes 
 .34 .40 0 2.71 
06¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKGLVFUHWLRQDU\
outcomes 
 .11 .25 0 2.16 
Count of other member states (above 
average trading partners) that dissent 
 .21 .57 0 6 
Count of other member states (average or 
below average trading partners) that 
dissent 
 .59 1.14 0 8 
      
Control variables      
QMV (=1; Unan=0) 1,930 .81  0 1 
Post-2004 (=1; Pre-2004=0) 1,384 .58  0 1 
New member state (=1; old MS=0) 614 .26  0 1 
*'3SHUFDSLWDµV  26.79 11.02 7.73 82.44 
Note: 2,384 observations. Units of analysis are member state-proposal dyads. 118 proposals. 
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Table 3. Factors affecting dissent 
 Model 1 
(continuous 
disagreement 
variables) 
Model 2 
(dichotomised 
disagreement 
variables) 
 exp(b) 
(s.e.) 
p exp(b) 
(s.e.) 
p 
Explanatory variables      
06¶Vdisagreement with 
non-discretionary outcomes 
2.69 
(.32) 
.00 1.99 
(.30) 
.03 
06¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK
discretionary outcomes 
2.61 
(.30) 
.00 1.60 
(.21) 
.03 
Other member states (above 
average trading partners) that 
dissent 
1.68 
(.08) 
.00 1.78 
(.08) 
.00 
Other member states 
(average or below average 
trading partners) that dissent 
1.27 
(.05) 
.00 1.27 
(.05) 
.00 
     
Control variables     
QMV (=1; Unan=0) 3.11 
(.45) 
.02 3.21 
(.46) 
.02 
Post-2004 (=1; Pre-2004=0) .74 
(.28) 
.28 .71 
(.27) 
.28 
New member state (=1; old 
MS=0) 
1.51 
(.48) 
.38 1.27 
(.40) 
.38 
*'3SHUFDSLWDµV 1.03 
(.01) 
.00 1.02 
(.01) 
.00 
Constant (b) -5.81 
(.55) 
.00 -5.73 
(.60) 
.00 
Log pseudolikelihood -320.74  -328.19  
Wald chi2 (p) 113.42 (.00)  136.19 (.00)  
n 2,384  2,384  
Note: Rare-events logistic regression. Standard errors clustered in 118 legislative proposals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
Figure 1. Frequency of dissent before the 2004 enlargement on selected proposals 
Note: MHPEHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXUUHJDUGLQJOHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOVYRWHGRQEHIRUHWKH
enlargement. Legislative proposals from the DEUII dataset. 
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Figure 2. Frequency of dissent after the 2004 enlargement on selected proposals 
Note: MHPEHUVWDWHV¶EHKDYLRXUUHJDUGLQJOHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOVYRWHGRQDIWHUWKH
enlargement.  
Legislative proposals from the DEUII dataset.  
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